Jihadism and insecurity represent major challenges for the countries along the Senegal-Niger river axis. This corridor, which crosses several West African states, is not only a vital space for trade, agriculture, and fishing but has also become a vulnerable area to security threats. With the rise of jihadist movements in the region, the security of riparian communities is increasingly compromised. This article offers an initial exploration of the links between jihadism, insecurity, and the impacts on the populations along the river axis, a central topic discussed at the young researchers' conference.
A context marked by the expansion of jihadist groups
Over the past two decades, West Africa has witnessed the rise of jihadist groups, some of which, such as the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), are active in the Sahel region. These groups extend beyond traditional borders, operating in cross-border areas where state structures are often weak. The Senegal-Niger river axis is particularly affected due to porous borders and the difficulty for states to maintain an effective security presence in these remote areas (Thurston, 2020).
Jihadists exploit institutional weaknesses and existing community conflicts to establish support bases, recruit new members, and destabilize local governments. These groups also profit from illicit trade networks, including drug and arms trafficking, to fund their operations. As a result, growing insecurity undermines the livelihoods of local populations who depend on river resources for survival (McCullough, 2018).
The socio-economic impacts of insecurity
Insecurity caused by jihadism has a direct impact on the populations along the Senegal-Niger river axis. Repeated attacks on riverside villages, kidnappings, and looting disrupt essential economic activities such as fishing, agriculture, and trade. Additionally, forced population displacement caused by jihadist violence creates a humanitarian crisis that exacerbates the precariousness of these communities. Abandoned villages and fallow lands result in a loss of food production, increasing the local populations' dependence on humanitarian aid (Benjaminsen & Ba, 2021).
The most affected communities are often those living in isolated areas and relying on the river for their daily subsistence. By disrupting access to these resources, insecurity jeopardizes food security and economic stability for the entire region. Furthermore, the constant fear of attacks drives many young people to migrate to urban centers or even to join armed groups in order to escape poverty, further fueling the cycle of violence and instability.
Governance and regional cooperation efforts
In response to the jihadist threat, the regional governments have taken coordinated actions to strengthen security along the river axis. One notable initiative is the G5 Sahel Group, which includes Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad. Although not directly linked to the Senegal-Niger axis, this cooperation effort could inspire similar initiatives to secure this river area. However, the limited resources, interstate tensions, and lack of mutual trust often hinder the effectiveness of these initiatives (Boukhars & Raineri, 2020).
To better address security challenges, effective cross-border governance is essential. This requires not only coordination between security forces of the different countries but also an integrated approach that considers the needs of local populations. Involving riparian communities in prevention and security efforts is crucial to strengthening local resilience to jihadism. Awareness campaigns, community mediation, and capacity building initiatives can help foster trust between the state and the populations, thus reducing the support base for jihadist groups.
Perspectives for regional stabilization
Stabilizing the Senegal-Niger river axis in the face of jihadist threats requires long-term strategies that go beyond military responses. From a security perspective, enhanced intelligence efforts, cross-border patrols, and cooperation between states are essential to effectively counter jihadist movements. However, it is also crucial to address the root causes of instability, such as poverty, youth unemployment, and land conflicts, which create fertile ground for recruitment by armed groups (Thurston, 2020).
In parallel, the economic and social development of riparian areas can play a stabilizing role. Development projects focused on sustainable management of river resources and creating local economic opportunities can help provide alternatives for populations, thereby reducing their vulnerability to the influence of jihadist groups. Finally, regional cooperation must be strengthened through initiatives such as intercommunity dialogues and shared resource management, which promote social cohesion and regional integration (Benjaminsen & Ba, 2021).
Conclusion
The security challenges posed by jihadism and insecurity along the Senegal-Niger river axis are complex and require an integrated approach, combining security, economic development, and regional cooperation. The young researchers' conference provided a platform for discussion and reflection on these crucial issues, shedding light on possible strategies to promote peace and stability in the region. By exploring these innovative solutions, researchers contribute to a safer future for riparian populations and for all of West Africa.
References
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Benjaminsen, T. A., & Ba, B. (2021). Violent and non-violent resistance to large-scale land acquisitions in Mali. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 48(3), 545-565.
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Boukhars, A., & Raineri, L. (2020). Insecurity and Migration in Africa’s Sahel Region. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
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McCullough, A. (2018). Water Resources and Conflict in the Sahel. Wilson Center.
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Thurston, A. (2020). Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel: Local Politics and Rebel Groups. Cambridge University Press.
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Zeitoun, M., & Warner, J. (2006). Hydro-hegemony: A framework for analysis of trans-boundary water conflicts. Water Policy, 8(5), 435-460.